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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1789, Thomas Jefferson described himself as suffering an
affliction that I suspect many law professors share. He wrote "I labour
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grievously under the malady of Bibliomanie."' Indeed he later went so
far as to inform John Adams in 1815 that "I cannot live without books."2
Jefferson indulged his hunger for books by collecting large numbers of
them throughout his life. The Library of Congress ultimately benefited
from Jefferson's addiction to book collecting: in 1815, Jefferson sold to
the government what he believed to be "the choicest collection of
books" in the country, nearly 7000 volumes.3 But he still could not stop
himself from collecting books and amassed a "retirement library" that
amounted to another 1600 volumes at the time of his death in 1826.4
Jefferson's insatiable urge to collect books was founded in
something more than mere avarice. His sale of his beloved library to the
government for public use shows how his book collecting was
inextricably bound to his Enlightenment belief that the widespread
exchange of books and knowledge was vital to good government.'
Jefferson's friend and correspondent of many years, James Madison,
shared this conviction. Both Jefferson and Madison were active
participants in the eighteenth century "Republic of Letters."6 This was a
vast global network of letter writers who sent each other books and
exchanged ideas on a wide variety of topics.7  Participants viewed the
Republic of Letters as unlimited by geography and open to any
interested person, regardless of resources, gender, nationality, religion,
or class.8  Actual participation in the eighteenth century Republic of
Letters was limited to the relatively small percentage of the population
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Lucy Ludwell Paradise (June 1, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 163 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1956).
2. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (June 10, 1815), in 4 MEMOIR,
CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES, FROM THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 263 (Thomas
Jefferson Randolph ed., 1829).
3. Jefferson's Library, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/jefflib.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2011).
4. Husna Haq, Thomas Jefferson's books-Sought by Researchers for Decades-Have Been
Found, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/Books/chapter-
and-verse/2011/0222/Thomas-Jefferson-s-books-sought-by-researchers-for-decades-have-been-
found.
5. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Richard Price (Jan. 8, 1789), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 553 (H. A. Washington ed., 1853); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to C.C.
Blatchly (1822), in 15 THE WRITINGS ON THOMAS JEFFERSON 399 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907).
6. Robert Darton, Google and the Future of Books, in THE CASE FOR BOOKS: PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE 14,4 (2009) [hereinafter Google and the Future ofBooks].
7. Andrew Burstein & Nancy Isenburg, MADISON AND JEFFERSON 278 (2010).
8. Robert Darnton, A Republic of Letters: Revolution, Art, and Ownership, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 2010, at BR 15 (reviewing COMMON AS AIR: REVOLUTION, ART, AND OWNERSHIP by
Lewis Hyde), available at http://www.progress.org/2010/founding.htm [hereinafter A Republic of
Letters: Revoluation, Art, and Ownership].
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that was literate.9 Yet Jefferson and Madison hoped for widespread
participation by citizens of the young republic. They believed that only
an educated and informed citizenry could effectively govern a republic.' 0
Jefferson's writings reveal his deeply held view that a copyright
monopoly posed a threat to the dissemination of creative works and
knowledge to the public," although he also recognized that granting a
copyright monopoly would incentivize the creation of copyrighted
works.12 Jefferson's fears about the dangers of monopolies were shared
by Madison, who was a driving force behind the inclusion of the
Copyright Clause in the Constitution and was likely significantly
responsible for its final wording.' 3  Madison thought it was vitally
important to protect the value of the diffusion of knowledge by limiting
the government's power to grant a copyright monopoly.14 Madison and
Jefferson both agreed that this protection was a necessary prerequisite
for effective republican self-government."
Disregard for the social value of a modern Republic of Letters like
that so revered by Madison and Jefferson is a conspicuous hallmark of
the Supreme Court's recent copyright case law. The four decisions in
which the Court has issued full opinions since 2001 (New York Times
Co. v. Tasini (2001), Eldred v. Ashcroft (2003), MGM Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd. (2005), and Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick (2010))
indicate that a majority of the Court does not share with Jefferson and
Madison a belief in the civic importance of protecting widespread public
access to creative works and knowledge.16  In these recent copyright
9. Id. See also Google and the Future ofBooks, supra note 6, at 4-5.
10. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Richard Price, supra note 5, at 553; Letter from
James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1819-1836,
at 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
11. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 443 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1956).
12. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 21 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
13. Edward C. Walterscheid, The Nature of the Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in
Historical Perspective 21 (2002).
14. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note, 12, at 21; James Madison, Aspects of Monopoly One Hundred
Years Ago (posthumously published in Harper's Magazine in 1914), reprinted in JAMES MADISON,
WRITINGS 756 (Jack N. Rakove, ed. 1999) [hereinafter MADISON, WRITINGS].
15. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 11, at 442-43; MADISON,
WRITINGS, supra note 14, at 756; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Madison (Aug. 28, 1789) in 15
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 367-68 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
16. New York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186 (2003), MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Reid Elsevier, Inc. v.
Muchnick, 130 S.Ct. 1237 (2010). In 2010, the Supreme Court heard another case involving a
copyright question, Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010), but affirmed the
2011] 207
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL
decisions, the Court has either ignored this value or has weighed it as
less important than ensuring financial rewards for authors.
Part II shows how the writings of Jefferson and Madison on the
dissemination of knowledge and the Copyright Clause reveal how highly
both men valued the ideal of public access to knowledge and creative
works as a bulwark of republican government. Part III points out that the
Court's copyright decisions over the past decade have not shared
Madison and Jefferson's solicitude for the value of public access to
knowledge and the Republic of Letters. Part IV concludes by warning
that the Court's disregard for the public interest in the dissemination of
knowledge and creative works risks eroding respect for the rule of law.
II. THE FOUNDING IDEAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS AND THE
COPYRIGHT CLAUSE
Both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison were prolific writers
and readers. Jefferson was so devoted to writing that he even designed
his own portable lap desk with a clever adjustable book rest and locking
drawer.17 Jefferson and Madison exchanged 1250 letters over fifty years
that discussed their ideas and ideals on the government of the new
republic, as well as an enormous number of other subjects.' 8 They also
exchanged books. While working in Paris, Jefferson sent Madison
hundreds of volumes.19
There is convincing evidence in the writings of Jefferson and
Madison that they both strongly valued the civic importance of the kind
of dissemination of knowledge and creative works that occurred in their
own correspondence and throughout the entire Republic of Letters.
Although the precise origins of the Copyright Clause are shrouded in
some mystery, Jefferson's and Madison's writings also show that the
limits in the Copyright Clause were specifically designed to promote
good governance by protecting the dissemination of knowledge and
creative works to the public.
Ninth Circuit in a 4-4 split without an opinion. Because there was no opinion, I do not consider this
case here.
17. SUSAN R. STEIN, THE WORLDS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON AT MONTICELLO 364-65 (1993).
18. James Morton Smith, 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776-1826 (1776-1790), at xi, 1 (1995). See also
ADRIENNE KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABORATION vii (1950).
19. SMITH, supra note 18, at 15.
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A. The Republic ofLetters and the Value of the Dissemination of
Knowledge to the Public
The term "Republic of Letters" first appears in Pierre Bayle's 1684
work, Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres. Bayle used it to describe
an ideal society that fostered egalitarian discourse on scientific matters.20
But something more than an ideal took hold over the course of the next
century. The Republic of Letters became a global network of
correspondence through which eighteenth-century people exchanged
books, journals, and other published materials, as well as sharing and
discussing ideas, including revolutionary political thought and scientific
experiments. Jefferson and Madison shared the same conception of the
Republic of Letters as modem historian Robert Darnton, who has written
that "[w]riters formulated ideas, and readers judged them. Thanks to the
power of the printed word, the judgments spread in widening circles, and
the strongest argument won." 2 ' Although most of the eighteenth-century
participants in the Republic of Letters were male and relatively
privileged, Darnton has pointed out that it had the potential for being "an
egalitarian world of knowledge open to everyone."22
For the American founding generation, identification with the
Republic of Letters fostered a sense of national community.23 It served
as "an expansive vision of learnedness, articulated especially during the
Revolutionary period, as a means of advancing 'liberty' and thereby
fulfilling the promise of a republican America." 24
Jefferson's writings make clear how greatly he esteemed the
dissemination of knowledge to the general public, based on his
conviction that only a public enlightened by knowledge was capable of
good republican governance. In many of his writings, Jefferson called
the dissemination of knowledge "diffusion," implying that knowledge
should travel from areas of relative high concentration to areas with
lower levels. For example, Jefferson wrote to Richard Price in 1789 that
"[w]henever the people are well informed, they can be trusted with their
20. Frank Shuffelton, In Different Voices: Gender in the American Republic of Letters, 25
EARLY AMERICAN LITERATURE 289 (1990).
21. Robert Darnton, Google and the Future of Books, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
(Feb. 12, 2009), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/feb/12/google-the-
future-of-books/.
22. A Republic ofLetters: Revolution, Art, and Ownership, supra note 8, at BR 15.
23. Shuffelton, supra note 20, at 289-90.
24. David D. Hall, Learned Culture in the Eighteenth Century, in The Colonial Book in the
Atlantic World, in I A HISTORY OF THE BOOK IN AMERICA 433 (Hugh Amory & David D. Hall
eds., 2000). See also Shuffelton, supra note 20, at 289.
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own government."25 Jefferson expressed a similar opinion in an 1816
letter to Dupont de Nemours:
Enlighten the people generally, and tyranny and oppressions of body
and mind will vanish like evil spirit at the dawn of day . . . I believe it
[human condition] susceptible of much improvement, and most of all,
in matters of government and religion; and that the diffusion of
knowled e among the people is to be the instrument by which it is
effected.
In 1822, Jefferson reiterated these views in a letter to C.C. Blatchly:
I look to the diffusion of light and education as the resource to be
relied on for ameliorating the condition, promoting the virtue, and
advancing the happiness of man. 27
Madison's writings show that he shared Jefferson's belief in the
importance of the Republic of Letters and the civic necessity of the
dissemination of knowledge to the public as a means of fostering
effective republican government. Like Jefferson, Madison used the
word "diffusion." For example, Madison wrote in a letter to George
Thomson in 1825: "The advancement and diffusion of knowledge is the
only guardian of true liberty." 28 Another example of Madison's views is
his statement in a letter to W.T. Barry in 1822:
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce, or a Tragedy; or perhaps
both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who
mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves with the power
to which knowledge gives." 29
This conviction that the public interest requires diffusion of
knowledge to the people was vitally important to the scope of the
Constitution's Copyright Clause in Article I, § 8, cl. 8, which provides
that Congress has legislative power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
25. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Richard Price, supra note 5, at 553.
26. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dupont de Nemours (Apr. 24, 1816), in THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF JEFFERSON AND Du PONT DE NEMOURS 259 (Mary Kay Hamalainen ed.,
1931).
27. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to C.C. Blatchly, supra note 5, at 399.
28. Letter from James Madison to George Thomson (June 30, 1825), in 3 LETTERs AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 492 (1865).
29. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry, supra note 10, at 103.
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Discoveries." 30 Although there is relatively little surviving information
as to the origins and drafting of this provision, the writings of Madison
and Jefferson unequivocally support the view that the grant of the
copyright monopoly was in the service of the Republic of Letters. The
Copyright Clause was specifically designed to facilitate the
dissemination of knowledge and creativity by both incentivizing authors
to create works and also limiting the ability of copyright owners to
withhold works from the public.
B. How the Value of the Republic ofLetters Shaped the Copyright
Clause
James Madison's notes of the Constitutional Convention state that
Madison submitted one of two original written proposals for a clause
giving Congress power to enact copyright legislation.3 1 Madison
proposed giving Congress the power "To secure to literary authors their
copy rights for a limited time." 32  The second proposal, by Charles
Pinckney, read "To secure to Authors exclusive rights for a certain
time." Madison's notes also indicate that the final draft of the
Copyright Clause was the work of the Committee of Eleven. 34 It was
adopted unanimously without debate.35 The final wording combines the
Madison and Pinckney proposals.
The constitutional ratification debate virtually ignored the
Copyright Clause. The longest discussion of it was by Madison in The
Federalist No. 43. Here Madison commented:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copy right of
authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right of
common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason
to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both
cases with the claims of individuals. The States cannot separately make
effectual provision for either of the cases, and most of them have
anticipated the decision of this point by laws passed at the instance of
Congress.36
30. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
31. James Madison, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 477 (Aug.
18, 1787) (1966).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 478 (Aug. 18, 1787).
34. Id. at 580 (Sept. 5, 1787).
35. Id. at 581 (Sept. 5, 1787).
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 204 (James Madison) (Ernest O'Dell ed., 2010).
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James Madison and Thomas Jefferson also referred to the
Copyright Clause in their correspondence. Writing to Madison in
December of 1787 to let him know what he disliked about the
Constitution, Jefferson was especially critical of the lack of a bill of
rights to protect against monopolies.n Jefferson again raised similar
concerns about the Copyright Clause in another letter written in July of
1788:
The saying that there shall be no monopolies lessens the incitements to
ingenuity, which is spurred on by the hope of a monopoly for a limited
time, as of 14 years; but the benefit even of limited monopolies is too
doubtful to be opposed to that of their general suppression.
Madison responded to Jefferson in October of the same year:
With regard to Monopolies they are justly classed among the greatest
nuisances in Government. But is it clear that as encouragements to
literary works and ingenious discoveries, they are not too valuable to
be wholly renounced? Would it not suffice to reserve in all cases a
right to the public to abolish the privilege at a price to be specified in
the grant of it? Is there not also infinitely less danger of this abuse in
our Governments than in most others? Monopolies are sacrifices of
the many to the few. Where the power is in the few it is natural for
them to sacrifice the many to their own partialities and corruptions.
Where the power, as with us, is in the many not in the few, the danger
can not be very great that the few will be thus favored. It is much
more to be dreaded that the few will be unnecessarily sacrificed to the
39
many.
Madison elaborated upon these views in a posthumously published
manuscript. He stated:
Monopolies though in certain cases useful ought to be granted with
caution, and guarded with strictness against abuse. The Constitution of
the U.S. has limited them to two cases, the authors of Books, and of
useful inventions, in both which they are considered as compensation
for a benefit actually gained to the community as a purchase of
property which the owner otherwise might withhold from public use.
There can be no just objection to a temporary monopoly in these cases;
37. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 440 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955).
38. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 11, at 442-43.
39. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 14, at 21.
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but it ought to be temporary, because under that limitation a sufficient
40
recompense and encouragement may be given ....
In the same essay Madison also noted: "In all cases of monopoly,
not excepting those in favor of authors and inventors, it would be well to
reserve to the State, a right to extinguish the monopoly by paying a
specified and reasonable sum." 4 1
In August of 1789 Jefferson sent Madison comments on a draft of
the Bill of Rights, which included some concerns about the
constitutional copyright monopoly. He stated:
[T]he following alternations and additions would have pleased me ...
Art. 9. Monopolies may be allowed to persons for their own
productions in literature . . . for a term not exceeding _ years but
for no longer term and for no other purpose.42
From the writings set out above, it is clear that both Jefferson and
Madison agreed that the grant of a copyright monopoly would not only
incentivize the creation of creative works, but also their public
dissemination. Only if there was both a steady supply of creative works
and public circulation of them could a Republic of Letters thrive.
But the writings of both men show serious concerns about the
danger to the public interest posed by all monopolies, including the
copyright monopoly. Jefferson and Madison differed as to whether the
limits in the Copyright Clause overcame these dangers. Madison
initially took the view that the limited monopoly granted by the
Copyright Clause was "coextensive with the public interest."4 3
However, he later expressed some lingering qualms that the copyright
monopoly could still be abused, as demonstrated by his repeated
suggestion that, to fully protect the public, the public should have a
reserved right to buy out the copyright owner and extinguish the
monopoly right. Modern copyright historians Tyler Ochoa and Mark
Rose have noted that Madison expressed these doubts within the context
of the then very short (fourteen years) copyright term applicable in most
states." Jefferson's writings show that he had far greater concerns than
Madison about the dangers to the public interest posed by the Copyright
Clause. Although Jefferson eventually accepted that the incentive to
40. MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 14, at 756.
41. Id. at 757.
42. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Madison, supra note 15, at 367-68.
43. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 204 (James Madison) (Ernest O'Dell ed., 2010).
44. Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright
Clause, J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y OF THE U.S.A. 675, 692 (2002).
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create was a sufficient basis for a copyright monopoly, he never
accepted that the Copyright Clause contained adequate limitations to
protect the public from abuses.
To Jefferson and Madison, the primary social goal of the Copyright
Clause was to achieve good government. The grant of copyright
furthered this political goal by incentivizing and supporting the
exchange of creativity carried out through the Republic of Letters. As
Lewis Hyde has recently written in Common as Air, "When it came to
the circulation of knowledge, three things mattered above all in what
used to be called the Republic of Letters: laying the ground for
democratic self-governance, encouraging creative community, and
enabling citizens to become public actors, both civic and creative.
Giving authors an incentive to produce more creative work was
socially valuable not simply because the production of creative work
was valuable in itself, but because the widespread dissemination of such
works would equip the general public to successfully govern themselves.
As Hyde has pointed out, to Jefferson and Madison, copyright was
"[d]irected ultimately toward citizenship and public life" rather than
primarily designed to create private wealth for authors.46 Creating
private wealth through the grant of monopoly privileges was a necessary
means to achieve the goal of successful republican self-government. To
achieve this goal required more than simply encouraging the creation of
copyrightable works; it also required that the government ensure their
public dissemination. As Madison had written, the benefit of the
copyright monopoly was a creative work which the owner "might
otherwise withhold from public use."4A Works withheld from public
circulation were lost to the Republic of Letters, and could not help to
build a citizenry that was capable and active in republican self-
governance.
Today, our society has developed digital networking technologies
that facilitate a far more globally inclusive Republic of Letters than
Madison or Jefferson likely ever imagined. Writings can be published to
millions across the globe with the mere click of a mouse. Unlike the
technology available to Madison and Jefferson, modern digital
technologies allow us to communicate in real time with many people
around the world. This technology holds the potential to foster active
45. LEWIS HYDE, COMMON AS AIR: REVOLUTION, ART, AND OWNERSHIP 77 (2010).
46. Id. at 107.
47. MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 14, at 756.
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participation in democratic self-governance, not only in the United
States but also across the globe.
To ensure that a Republic of Letters could thrive, Madison warned
that the government should be vigilant in "guard[ing]" copyrights
"against abuse.' Has the Supreme Court heeded this advice over the
past decade? To what extent have its opinions on copyright law shared
Madison and Jefferson's concern with protecting the Republic of Letters
by protecting the dissemination of knowledge? The next section
considers these questions.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S COPYRIGHT CASE LAW OVER THE PAST
TEN YEARS
The Court's decisions over the past decade have shown little
solicitude for the founding value of a Republic of Letters and the social
importance of the dissemination of knowledge and creative works.
Below, I show how the four copyright decisions handed down since
2001 have ignored or downplayed these values. I consider these
decisions in chronological order except for Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick,
which I discuss immediately after Tasini since both cases involved many
of the same issues and parties.
A. New York Times v. Tasini
On first reading, the Tasini case may seem to be a dispute primarily
centering on the competing interests of authors versus publishers, rather
than involving the public interest in the dissemination of knowledge.
Certainly, the majority opinion of Justice Ginsburg, joined by six of her
brethren, framed the dispute as one between authors and publishers in
ruling that publishers had interfered with authorial rights guaranteed by
Congress.4 9 But as the dissent of Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Breyer, predicted, the Tasini decision has had a very serious adverse
impact on the public's access to knowledge, a value whose importance
Ginsburg significantly downplayed.
I will sketch only briefly the factual background and legal issues in
Tasini. The plaintiffs were several freelance authors, who brought suit
against three publishers of major print periodicals as well as the owners
of electronic publishing businesses that stored electronic copies of news
48. Id.
49. New York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
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articles in computerized database services and CD-ROM products.so
There were various agreements in place between the print publishers and
the electronic publishers authorizing reproduction of print articles in
electronic form, but no agreements authorizing this between the
freelance authors and the print publishing companies.' The authors
alleged that the republication of their articles in electronic form
amounted to copyright infringement, specifically of the reproduction and
public distribution rights.52
The publishers did not assert fair use, basing their defense entirely
on the assertion that the electronic republications were privileged as
"revisions" of the original print publications pursuant to section 201(c)
of the Copyright Act, which provides:
In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any rights
under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to
have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the
contribution as part of that particular collective work, any revision of
that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series.53
The district court, in an opinion written by Sonia Sotomayor, had
granted summary judgment to the publishers on the basis that the section
201(c) privilege applied.54  The Second Circuit reversed, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the electronic
publications were privileged under section 201(c).5
By a 7-2 majority, the Court found that, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the section 201(c) privilege did not shield the publishers
from copyright infringement. 5 6 According to Justice Ginsburg, finding
for the publishers would "shrink authorial rights" that "Congress [has]
established." 57 The electronic versions of the articles did not fall into
any of the three categories protected by Congress: (a) "that collective
work" to which the freelancer had contributed the article; (b) "any
revision of that collective work" or (c) "any later work in the same
series."5 s In Ginsburg's view, Congress had limited the publishers'
privilege to only these three categories to ensure that the author would
50. Id. at 483.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 484.
54. Id.
55. Id at 492-93.
56. Id. at 506.
57. Id
58. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
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be the one to benefit from a work later commanding a higher price than
that for which the author had initially been able to negotiate.
The publishers had argued that the applicable category was "any
revision of that collective work."6 0  Justice Ginsburg disagreed. She
focused on how the electronic articles appeared to a user of the
databases. When a user carried out a search of the databases, each
article appeared separately within the results and also lacked certain
material with which it had originally been published, such as graphics
and formatting.61 As a result, the electronic article could not fairly be
said to be published "as part of' a "revision" of the print collective work
in which it had originally been published. Ginsburg analogized to a 400-
page novel quoting a sonnet in passing.62 This would not, she asserted,
amount to a "revision" of the work. Even if a user could, at least
hypothetically, search the databases and generate all of the articles from
a particular print periodical edition, this could not shield the database
from infringement because it did not present the freelance author's
contribution as part of a revision of the collective work.
Justice Ginsburg was quite dismissive of the publishers' concerns
about the public interest. They had voiced concerns that a ruling for the
authors would, as she put it "punch gaping holes in the electronic record
of history."6 But Ginsburg took the view that such future harm was too
speculative to trump author's rights.64 Moreover, she felt that this harm
could be avoided through the order of appropriate remedies. She
pointed out that injunctive relief might not be appropriate and was
certainly not required. She suggested that agreements could be crafted
that would protect the historical record, citing, for example, the blanket
licensing used in music licensing and consent decrees governing their
67
operation.
But the electronic record of history has in fact suffered unremedied
harm. Starting almost immediately after the Supreme Court handed
down its opinion in Tasini, there was an alarmingly negative impact on
public access to freelance articles in the electronic databases. Electronic
publishers removed a huge number of articles from their databases. The
59. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497.
60. Id at 485.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 500.
63. Id. at 505.
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New York Times swiftly removed 115,000 articles from its online
database, amounting to about 8% of its content from 1980-1995.68  It
offered authors the opportunity to restore them if they entered into
waivers of past and future claims, but many authors were unwilling to
agree.69 Gaping holes have indeed been punched in the historical record.
Researchers who use the electronic databases can have no confidence
that any search of a print publisher's publications is complete.
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg's solicitude for authors resulted only in
a pyrrhic victory for them. Print publishers reacted to Tasini by requiring
freelance authors to enter into contractual agreements to sign over
electronic rights to their articles, generally without paying them anything
additional for such undertakings. 7 0 Most freelance authors were not in
bargaining position to object to these additional agreements.
The remedies that Justice Ginsburg suggested could be crafted to
protect the public's ability to access the electronic versions of the
articles have not materialized, because the case has not gone to trial.
The parties and many other freelance authors whose class action claims
were consolidated with theirs entered into a settlement agreement in
March 2005."
Although the Supreme Court ruled on a jurisdictional challenge to
this settlement in its most recent copyright decision, Reed Elsevier v.
Muchnick, the settlement's fairness remains in dispute.72 As explained
in the next section, the Muchnick decision ignores the public interest in
accessing knowledge and creative works that was an essential goal of the
Copyright Clause.
B. Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick
In Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, the Court considered a question of
copyright formalities that arose in connection with the 2005 settlement
that followed the Tasini decision. Negotiated between an unwieldy
group of publishers, database services, freelance authors, and three
68. Amir A. Naini, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 9, 25 (2002);
Pete Wetmore, Tasini Ruling Will Give Databases a Shake, NEWSINC. (July 2, 2001),
http://www.allbusiness.com/informationlinformation-services-news-syndicates/808883-1.htmi.
69. Naini, supra note 68.
70. Giusippina D'Agostino, Freelance Authors for Free: Globalization of Publishing,
Convergence of Copyright Contracts, and Divergence ofJudicial Reasoning, in I NEW DIRECTIONS
IN COPYRIGHT 25 (F. Macmillan ed., 2005).
71. In re Literary Works in Electronic Databases Copyright Litigation, 509 F.3d 116, 119 (2d
Cir. 2007), rev'd and remanded sub nom., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. CL 1237 (2010).
72. See Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. 1237.
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author professional associations (the National Writers Union, the
American Society of Journalists and Authors, and the Authors Guild),
the settlement limited payouts to between $10 million and $18 million,
with agreed reductions for attorneys' fees and administrative costs. 73
Freelance authors would receive differing amounts under the
settlement depending on a combination of factors. These include
whether the authors own registered copyrights in their articles, the
amount of the original fee paid for the article, the year of publication,
and whether the writer has agreed to permit future use of articles in
databases.74 The payouts were designed to compensate for both past
infringement (65% of the payout) and future electronic use (35% of the
payout). If an author did not agree to permit future use of the articles
in the databases, he or she would only get 65% of the possible payout for
the relevant category. Authors in some categories, especially those
who had never registered copyright or who failed to register copyright
until more than three months after publication, might never receive any
settlement payouts if the number of claims by authors who owned
registered copyrights drained the capped settlement fund. The vast
majority of potential claims (more than 99%) were by holders of
unregistered copyrights.7 7
The parties made a motion to the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York to certify a class for settlement and
approve the settlement agreement. Ten freelance authors, led by Irvin
Muchnick ("the Muchnick group"), objected to the settlement for
various reasons. These included contentions that the settlement fund
was too low, the individual claim awards were too low, the settlement
set a dangerous and unfair precedent because of the distinct possibility
that many infringed authors would receive no payouts, and the release of
future claims was too broad and too vague.78 Rejecting these objections,
the district court certified a settlement class under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and approved the settlement as fair, reasonable,
73. Settlement Agreement with Final Exhibits Attached, In re Literary Works in Electronic
Databases Copyright Litigation, 509 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2007), MDL No. 1379. See also Corrected
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 10, In re Literary Works in Electronic Databases Copyright
Litigation, 509 F.3d 136 (2006) (No. 05-5943-CV(L)), 2006 WL 6362645.
74. In re Literary Works, 509 F.3d at 120.
75. Corrected Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 73, at 31.
76. Corrected Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 73, at 12.
77. Corrected Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 73, at 6.
78. Irvin Muchnick, Objection Project Starts, FREELANCE RIGHTS (May 31, 2005, 8:58 AM),
http://freelancerights.blogspot.com/2005_05_01_archive.html.
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and adequate under that Rule. 79 The Muchnick group appealed to the
Second Circuit.
None of the Muchnick group's objections before the district court
or on appeal had been based on the contention that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. However, just before oral argument,
the Second Circuit raised this issue sua sponte. It ordered briefing on the
issue of whether the statutory registration provision in § 411(a) of the
Copyright Act deprived federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over
infringement claims.so Although all the parties agreed that the district
court had subject matter jurisdiction to certify a class of claims arising
from unregistered works or approve a settlement for such claims, the
Second Circuit found that § 411(a) was jurisdictional in nature and ruled,
2-1, that the district court therefore lacked jurisdiction to approve the
settlement.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether §
411(a) was jurisdictional in nature.82 Since no party supported the ruling
of the Court of Appeals, the Court invited Deborah Merritt, a former law
clerk to Justice Ginsburg, to defend the Court of Appeals as amicus
curiae.83 Merritt found herself fighting the typically uphill battle of a
friend of the Court appointed in such circumstances. She failed to
convince any of the Supreme Court justices that the Court of Appeals
had ruled correctly, although she received praise for "ably discharg[ing]
her assigned responsibilities." 84 Only eight justices participated; Justice
Sotomayor recused herself, perhaps because she had been involved in
the Second Circuit's procedural deliberations as a judge on that court or
possibly because she had authored the district court opinion in Tasini.ss
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Thomas found that § 411(a)
was not jurisdictional because it was not "clearly state[d] as such" by
Congress. 86 It imposed a non-jurisdictional precondition to suit.87 The
Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the
79. In re Literary Works, 509 F. 3d at 118.
80. Reed Elsevier, Inc., v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1242 (2010).
81. In re Literary Works, 509 F.3d at 121.
82. See Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, 129 S. Ct. 1523 (2009).
83. Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1243 n.3.
84. Id.
85. Vivia Chen, Recusal Report: Cases Where Justices Have Stepped Aside, THE NATIONAL
LAW JOURNAL (June 30, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1 202463163599&slretum= I &hbxlogin=l.
86. Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1247.
87. Id.
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case back to the Second Circuit to rule on the Muchnick group's appeal
of the district court's approval of the 2005 settlement.
In his opinion in Muchnick, Justice Thomas did not discuss the
public interest in the circulation of creative works or information. Nor
did he expressly consider the likely effect of his ruling on the Republic
of Letters so valued by Jefferson or Madison. This is so even though
several of the briefs filed with the Court raised the issue of access to the
articles.89 For example, a brief filed on behalf of respondents Letty
Cotton Pogrebin and others argued that
[w]ith no comprehensive settlement in place, the publishers and
databases will have no choice but to search for and delete whole
swaths of freelance works from their digital archives, or risk repetitive
litigation over the same dispute the parties sought to settle in this case.
Such gaps in the reading archive will compromise the interests of the
reading public.90
The Court-appointed amicus Deborah Merritt argued, in contrast,
that
[n]one of the parties control our nation's historical archives. The
database defendants market commercial products that reproduce some
potions of periodicals published during recent decades. For many
publications, coverage dates back no further than 1990; even before
this litigation, moreover, the defendants omitted tables, photographs,
and other significant elements from included works. Most important,
the defendants have never promised to preserve their records as a
historical resource-or even to restore the works disputed in this
controversy. 91
Neither of these arguments is fully convincing. Merritt ignored the
problem that researchers who use the electronic databases can no longer
assume they are a complete database of the textual parts of articles
published in the print publications. This seriously reduces the value of
the databases for scholarship. Pogrebin and her fellow respondents
ignored the fact that the 2005 settlement does not require freelancers to
plug the hole in the electronic record by agreeing to future use of their
88. Id at 1249.
89. See Brief for Respondents Pogrebin et al. in Support of Petitioners at 4, Reed Elsevier v.
Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2009) (No. 08-103), 2009 WL 1387834; Brief of Court-Appointed
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Judgment Below at 63, Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, 130 S.Ct. 1237
(Aug. 9,2009) (No. 08-103), 2009 WL 2588281.
90. Brief for Respondents Pogrebin et al., supra note 89, at 4.
91. Brief for Court-Appointed Arnicus Curiae, supra note 89, at 63.
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articles in the electronic databases. They can instead choose to accept a
lower payout (if one is even forthcoming, which would depend on their
category, as explained above).
Justice Thomas's opinion was silent as to the effect of his ruling on
public access to information and creative works. Madison would surely
have been disappointed that Thomas did not even note the value of
protecting the dissemination of knowledge and creative expression.
The Court more actively downplayed this value in its 2003 case on
the constitutional validity of changes to the copyright term, Eldred v.
Ashcroft. In Eldred, the Court assessed the value of public access to
creative works as significantly less than the value of incentivizing
authors to create such works. This is inconsistent with the goals
underlying the copyright monopoly, as set out in Part II, above.
C. Eldred v. Ashcroft
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court, 7-2, rejected a
constitutional challenge to the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act of 1998 ("CTEA").92 Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in this
case did not share the framers' conviction that the copyright monopoly
should be limited to protect the social value of access to knowledge. She
did not, apparently, endorse their ideal of a Republic of Letters as an
agent of civic virtue.
The CTEA significantly increased the copyright monopoly by
adding an additional twenty years to the term of existing copyrights.93
As a result, the basic term of copyright was now life plus seventy years.
In combination, the CTEA and the 1976 Copyright Act had more than
doubled the basic term of copyright in just twenty years, assuming that
the author attained the age of 76.7 years, the average life expectancy in
the United States in 1998.94
The petitioners in the Eldred case were individuals and businesses
whose livelihood relied on using creative works in the public domain.95
Their arguments to the Court emphasized the framers' fears of the social
dangers of overly powerful monopolies, founded on the historical
experience of the abuses of the sixteenth and seventeenth century
English publishing monopolies granted by the Crown. They reminded
92. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
93. Id. at 195.
94. Robert N. Anderson, United States Life Tables, 1998, CDC NAT'L VrrAL STATISTICS
REPORTs, vol 48, no. 18, Feb. 7, 2001.
95. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193.
96. Brief for Petitioners at 23-28, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
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the justices that the framers had intentionally limited the Copyright
monopoly to protect against such abuses and to ensure the broad
dissemination of creative works on which others could build.97
The petitioners claimed in Eldred that the CTEA's retroactive term
extension violated the "limited Times" requirement in the Copyright
Clause as well as the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech.
They argued that retroactive term extensions were not really limited
because Congress could make them perpetual by adding to them
incrementally. Moreover, retroactive extensions did not promote the
"Progress of Science," as the Constitution required. The grant of a
copyright monopoly was at essence a bargain between the copyright
owner and the public; the monopoly was granted for a "limited Time[ ]"
in exchange for a "Writing" by an "Author."99 According to the
petitioners, the CTEA was not consistent with such a bargain, but was
simply a windfall monopoly for copyright owners.
Rejecting the petitioners' contention that the CTEA violated the
Copyright Clause, Justice Ginsburg failed to give any real heed to
Madison's exhortation that the government be vigilant against abuse of
the copyright monopoly. In finding that the CTEA survived
constitutional scrutiny as a rational exercise of congressional judgment,
Ginsburg was so deferential to Congress that she failed to independently
consider whether the CTEA's retroactive term extension was consistent
with the framer's conviction that the monopoly must not only benefit
authors but must also serve the public interest in accessing
information.'01 Ginsburg gave short shrift to petitioner's argument that
heightened scrutiny applied.
Ginsburg's application of rational basis scrutiny relied on several
stated reasons. 102  Congress sought to ensure consistency with the
copyright term required in the European Union so that American authors
would receive the same protection there as Europeans, and would also
have a greater incentive to create and disseminate their works in the
United States.103 Moreover, Congress was responding to demographic
trends, such as increasing longevity."' 4 Congress was also attempting to
ensure that the copyright term would better keep pace with the increased
97. Id at 10.
98. Id. at 17-31, 34-48.
99. Id. at 23.
100. Id.
101. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 188 (2003).
102. Id. at 205-08.
103. Id. at 205-06.
104. Id. at 206-07 & 207 n.14.
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commercial life for many works as a result of the growth in
communications media. 05  Finally, Congress rationally "credited
projections that longer terms would encourage copyright owners to
invest in the restoration and public distribution of their works."o6
All the justifications accepted by Ginsburg as rational clearly
benefit copyright owners at the expense of users of copyrighted works.
Ensuring that U.S. authors get the longer copyright term enjoyed by their
European Union counterparts is a benefit to authors but not users of
copyrighted works since works that would have fallen into the public
domain remain protected by copyright. The same is true for the
rationale that longer-lived authors deserve to have longer copyright
terms. The justification that works need to be protected for a longer time
because technological advances have increased their commercial life
also benefits authors at the expense of users. The only justification that
could arguably benefit the users of copyrighted works would be the
incentive to restore old works, but Ginsburg provides no evidence that
restored works would be made available to users on affordable terms or
at all. Indeed, as Lawrence Lessig has forcefully argued, the opposite is
arguably the case. Lessig has pointed out that copyright protection has
not in fact provided any actual incentive to restore the majority of old
films lacking current commercial value, which are rapidly crumbling to
dust in old film canisters. 0 7 Those who could cheaply restore them by
digitizing them cannot afford the costs of clearing the rights to them.
Nowhere in Ginsburg's discussion of congressional justifications for
CTEA does she express any real concern for the social importance of
furthering free public access to creative works, unhindered by
restrictions of cost. This is very much at odds with the framers' concern
for fostering the Republic of Letters.
Ginsburg also rejected petitioners' argument that the CTEA
violated the copyright bargain. She recognized that copyright was, at its
essence, a bargain. 08 But she saw it as a bargain with authors to
encourage creation of works, rather than, as a quid pro quo to ensure
public dissemination of creative works. Ginsburg's view is clear from
her citation to Mazur v. Stein:
"The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
105. Id
106. Id at 207.
107. Lawrence Lessig, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW
TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 223-24 (2004).
108. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 214.
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individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors."'0
In support of her approach, Ginsburg contrasted patent law with
copyright law. She stated that, for patents, "immediate disclosure is not
the objective of, but is exacted from, the patentee. It is the price paid for
the exclusivity secured [citation omitted]. In contrast, disclosure is the
desired objective, not something exacted from the author in exchange for
the copyright.""o But Ginsburg's opinion is not supportive of a
Republic of Letters. It is contrary to Madison's statement that:
The Constitution of the U.S. has limited [monopolies] to two cases, the
authors of Books, and of useful inventions, in both which they are
considered as compensation for a benefit actually gained to the
community as a purchase of property which the owner otherwise might
withhold from public use.'I'
Ginsburg gave significant interpretative weight to the historical
practice of several retroactive term extensions for copyrights and
patents, as well as nineteenth century precedent upholding prior
retroactive patent extensions, although she noted that the Court had not
previously considered the constitutional validity of retroactive copyright
term extensions.112 But, as pointed out by Justice Stevens in dissent,
history is not dispositive evidence of constitutional meaning, especially
since the relevant historical practice only began in the mid-nineteenth
century. 1 3 By this time, the men of the founding generation, who could
perhaps be said to best understand the true meaning of the Constitution,
were no longer participating in the legislative process.114
The dissents of Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer are both much
more consistent with protecting a Republic of Letters. Both shared
Madison's view that the Copyright Clause served dual interests:
encouraging the creation of creative works but also their public
dissemination."s Both dissenting justices criticized Ginsburg for being
overly deferential to Congress.!1 Stevens noted that Ginsburg's
approach made "Congress's actions under the Copyright/Patent Clause
109. Id. (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
110. Id. at 216.
Ill. MADiSON, WRITINGS, supra note 14, at 756.
112. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 203.
113. Id at 237 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 223-27; id. at 244 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 264 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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[], for all intents and purposes, judicially unreviewable."" He felt this
was an abdication of the proper judicial role enunciated in Marbury v.
Madison."8  Madison himself would likely have shared Stevens'
concern that the Eldred majority had failed in its obligation to be
sufficiently vigilant in guarding against abusive monopolies. Madison
would also have almost certainly been disappointed, as was Justice
Stevens, that the Eldred majority did not share his vision of copyright
monopoly that the reward to the author was a means, not an end.
Vigilance for the protection of the public interest in accessing
creative works and knowledge was also absent from the Court's 2005
decision in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
D. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
In MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the Court had to rule on
whether the makers of free P2P file sharing software could be sued for
secondary copyright infringement by users downloading copyrighted
content."' Like the Tasini case, at first glance the Grokster dispute
initially does not appear to concern the value of supporting a modern-
day Republic of Letters by protecting public access to information or
creative works. It may seem to be about the correct balance between the
value of supporting creative works through copyright and that of
promoting technological innovation. And indeed, the Court's majority
opinion portrayed the case as exemplifying that issue. But in fact, the
Grokster decision does have implications for the public's access to
creative works and knowledge, which the majority ignored. Just as it
had in the three other copyright cases decided over the past ten years, the
Grokster Court did not display the founding value of concern for
protecting a Republic of Letters.
In Grokster. the Court considered whether the lower courts should
not have granted summary judgment dismissing a lawsuit for secondary
copyright infringement against Grokster and StreamCast, the distributors
of free P2P file sharing software.120 The plaintiffs were twenty-eight
motion picture studios, music companies and other copyright owners.121
All nine justices agreed that the lower courts had erred in granting
summary judgment.122 Even though the software distributed by Grokster
117. Id. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 920.
122. Id. at 934.
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and StreamCast enabled users to communicate directly with each other
without making use of any centralized server, all the justices agreed that
there was substantial evidence that Grokster and StreamCast had
induced copyright infringement in the course of marketing their
software.12 3 Justice Souter, who wrote the opinion of the Court, stated:
We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting
its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other
affirmative steps taken to foster infrin ement, is liable for the resulting
acts of infringement by third parties.12
Souter found on the evidence that StreamCast and Grokster
intended that the users of their software would use it to share
copyrighted content. 125  None of his brethren disagreed. The record
revealed that StreamCast had aggressively marketed itself as "the next
Napster."l 2 6 When Napster was sued for secondary infringement, both
StreamCast and Grokster actively positioned themselves to recruit
Napster uses after Napster ceased business.12 7 Additional evidence in
support of this intent was the choice of Grokster and StreamCast to use a
business model in which the revenue source was principally
advertising.128 Because the companies received no revenue from users
of their free software, they generated income by the sale of advertising
space, and the amount of such income depended on the volume of
users.129 They were more likely to build the number of users from those
who were going to use their products to download new and trendy
copyrighted works than older works in the public domain. 30
Additionally, StreamCast and Grokster knew their software was being
sued for illegal uses but took no steps to filter infringing content or block
users who were sharing infringing content.' 3 '
Though in accord as to the issue of inducement of copyright
infringement, the justices did not agree about the applicability of the
famous Sony decision to peer-to-peer ("P2P") technology. In Sony, the
Court had ruled that the makers of the Betamax VCR were not liable for
secondary copyright infringement. Even though the VCR could be used
123. Id. at 916.
124. Id at 919.
125. Id at 940.
126. Id. at 924.
127. Id. at 924-25.
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to infringe copyright, it was "capable of commercially significant
noninfringing uses."l32 In Grokster, Justice Souter found that the Sony
safe harbor was simply inapplicable where there was evidence of
inducement of infringement, and refused to consider it further.3 3  A
majority of his colleagues disagreed, taking the view that the Court
should opine on whether the Sony safe harbor would apply to Grokster
or StreamCast absent evidence of inducement. 1 34 But because these six
justices joined two very different concurring opinions, the Court reached
no consensus on Sony's applicability to P2P technologies.
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, argued that the Sony safe harbor would not have extended to
Grokster and StreamCast even without direct evidence of inducement
because, at least on the record in this case, their software was not a
"staple article of commerce" that had "substantial noninfringing uses." 35
The evidence showed that the software had overwhelmingly been used
for infringement and there was no reasonable prospect that substantially
noninfringing uses would be likely to develop over time.
But Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, disagreed, finding that, on the evidence, "Grokster passes
Sony's test" and is "capable of commercially significant non-infringing
uses."13 Breyer argued that "a strong demonstrated need for modifying
Sony (or for interpreting Sony's standard more strictly) has not been
shown," because "the nature of [. . .]lawfully swapped files is such that it
is reasonable to infer quantities of current lawful use roughly
approximate to those at issue in Sony."l 3 7
A serious problem with the Grokster decision is that the Court has
left too much uncertainty as to when a distributor of P2P technology will
be liable for secondary infringement where there is no clear evidence of
inducement. In such a case, when, if at all, will Sony's safe harbor
apply? How substantial or real must the noninfringing uses of P2P
technology be for Sony to protect the distributor of that technology?
The Supreme Court provided no real guidance in Grokster, and thus has
created a climate of uncertainty for the manufacturers and distributors of
P2P technology.
132. Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
133. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933.
134. Id. at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 945-48.
136. Id. at 952.
137. Id. at 953.
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This climate of uncertainty raises concerns for the Republic of
Letters. P2P software is technology that enables a swift and global
sharing of creativity and ideas between many citizens of the world. As
Justice Breyer noted, such technology "permits the exchange of any sort
of digital file- whether that file does, or does not, contain copyrighted
material."'3 Too much uncertainty over when a P2P software
distributor will be liable for secondary infringement may chill
technological development of such software, and stunt the power of such
technology to foster a twenty-first century Republic of Letters. The
Court missed the opportunity in Grokster to craft a modern day Sony
safe harbor that ensures that copyright protection serves the Madisonian
and Jeffersonian vision of the importance of a Republic of Letters and
the value of public dissemination of information and creative works.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent disregard for the founding
understanding of the copyright balance as designed to foster the
Republic of Letters and the dissemination of ideas or creative works
carries with it a grave risk for the rule of law.
Justice Stephen Breyer has recently warned in his book Making
Our Democracy Work, the Court must be wary of its own fragility.139
According to Breyer, the justices must focus greater attention on the
importance of building public acceptance or risk a breakdown of the rule
of law. Although Breyer did not discuss copyright in this book, he
would no doubt agree that if the Court fails to adequately maintain the
public's trust in its copyright decisions when weighing the copyright
balance, it risks alienating the public and fostering disrespect and
disregard for the rule of copyright law. This has arguably already
happened. In 2003, a Pew survey found that 67% of downloaders and
65% of file sharers did not care whether the music files they downloaded
or shared were copyrighted.140 A survey conducted by Digital Life
America in 2006 reported that while 78% of Americans believed that
taking a DVD from a store without payment was a "very serious
138. Id. at 954.
139. STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE'S VIEW, xii-xiii (2010).
140. Amanda Lenhart & Mary Madden, Music Downloading, File-sharing and Copyright, in
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offense," only 40% believed that downloading a copyrighted movie was
a "very serious offense."l 4 1
Where the rule of law is already eroding, the Court must be even
more vigilant to maintain public confidence in its legitimacy as the
interpreter of the Copyright Clause and the Copyright Act. The Court's
recent disregard for the clear understanding of the framers that the
copyright monopoly's rewards to authors was designed to promote a
Republic of Letters seems unlikely to bolster public confidence that the
Court truly has the public interest in mind.
141. Dawn Kawamoto, Study: Most Don't See Downloading Movies as 'Very Serious. ', CNET
NEWS (Jan. 25, 2007), http://news.cnet.com/Study-Most-dont-see-downloading-movies-as-very-
serious/2100-1025_3-6153472.html.
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